This paper studies the effects of a one-child policy. A benchmark without the fertility constraint is compared to a counterfactual experiment with the fertility constraint in place. The results suggest that imposing the one-child policy promotes the accumulation of human capital and increases output per capita. In partial equilibrium, an unskilled adult's welfare is lowered by the policy. However, in general equilibrium, the policy triggers a decrease in the supply of unskilled labor, which increases the unskilled wage rate. Thus, an unskilled adult is in fact better off with the policy due to higher wages. This paper demonstrates the importance of accounting for general-equilibrium effects and heterogeneity when analyzing population policies.
Introduction
China has introduced the one-child family policy since 1979 in order to control rapid population growth. However, the debate on the one-child policy continues after three decades. On the positive side, the policy lowers the fertility, which contributes to economic * Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Economics, UCLA. This paper will be the third chapter of my growth and improves living standards of a family.
1 On the negative side, Bongaarts and Greenhalgh (1985) discuss the possible social and economic problems with the onechild policy, such as the detrimental effects on the age composition of the population; sex imbalance; the issue of support of elderly people; psychological effects on the only children; and preclusion of the development of family firms, which has spurred growth in other East Asian countries.
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Most studies explore the effects of a one-child policy empirically. In contrast with the existing literature, this paper takes the lead in studying this issue by a theoretical approach: an overlapping generations model with a fertility constraint is employed to discuss the impacts of the policy on fertility, age structure, human-capital accumulation, and output per capita. Changes of welfare resulted from a one-child policy can also be measured by quantitative analysis. In addition, this paper considers heterogeneous individuals. The literature discusses the policy from an aggregate perspective. However, different groups in one economy may react differently to the policy. Therefore, the effects of a one-child policy on skilled adults and unskilled adults are examined in this paper.
This paper builds on the theoretical model of Liao (2009) . The benchmark model is a three-period overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility. Children do not work, but depend on their parents for support. If they survive, children become adults.
Adults make decisions and supply labor to the production sector. Then, subject to a survival probability, adults become elderly who consume their own savings. An adult chooses consumption, asset holdings, the number of children he wants, and an education level for his children. Education is discrete, either skilled or unskilled. The production sector is perfectly competitive. There exists a representative firm using skilled labor, unskilled labor, and physical capital as inputs.
To compare with the benchmark, a fertility constraint is introduced to the model, 1 McElroy and Yang (2000) suggest that China's population policies have played a important role in lowering China's fertility. Li, Zhang, and Zhu (2005) also find similar results. In addition, Li and Zhang (2007) shows that the birth rate has a negative impact on economic growth, suggesting that China's birth control policy is growth enhancing.
2 Hesketh and Zhu (1997) also discuss the good and the bad of the one-child policy. Hesketh, Lu, and Zhu (2005) report the sex ratio at birth and the ratio of old-age dependency in China. The sex ratio is defined as the proportion of male live births to female live births. In industrial countries, it is about 1.03-1.07. In China, the sex ratio was 1.17 in 2001. The ratio of old-age dependency in China was 7.5 percent in 2005 but is expected to rise to more than 15 percent by 2025. representing the implementation of a one-child policy. China's one-child policy refers to the restriction of having one child in one family. Parents who follow the policy will have government subsidies and also get priority in schooling, housing, health care, and work.
On the other hand, punishments are also built in the policy. For example, the government workers will be punished by cutting 20 percent of their basic salary for seven years if they have a second child. To be simply, subsidies and punishments are not considered in this paper. Besides, the marriage system is ignored. Thus, a young adult is allowed to have a half or fewer kids when the policy is imposed. Though China's one-child policy is only strictly applied to urban areas, the policy in the model is applied to all young adults without exception.
In the experiment, the benchmark is calibrated to represent the demographic change without fertility restriction. Then, a counterfactual experiment with a one-child policy is carried out. Any country could be the candidate for the quantitative analysis. This paper selects Taiwan in 1970 Taiwan in -2004 . First of all, Taiwan and China have similar traditional culture, such as the preference for having boys rather than girls and the expectation of family support at old age. Second, the decline in fertility in Taiwan was nearly the same as in China in 1965 -1990 , as reported in Johnson (1994 .
3 Given these similarities, Taiwan may serve as a useful benchmark to explore the effects of a one-child policy.
The quantitative results show that imposing a one-child policy promotes the accumulation of human capital: the human capital is about 42 percent higher than that in the benchmark. This is consistent with the idea suggested by Becker and Lewis (1973) that a decrease in the quantity of children releases resources to children so that the average quality of children increases. 4 In addition, the policy leads to higher output per capita, which supports the empirical findings in Li and Zhang (2007) . Table 1 in Johnson (1994) provides fertility rates for China and other eight countries in . The fertility rate for China in 1965-70 and 1985-90 was 5.99 and 2.38, respectively. Thus, the percentage decline was about 60 percent. The fertility rate for Taiwan was 4.2 and 1.74, respectively. The percentage decline was about 59 percent.
4 Rosenzweig and Zhang (2006) suggest that the contribution of the one-child policy in China to the development of its human capital is modest. The policy results in an increase in schooling attainment by 4 percent at most, the probability of attending college by less than 9 percent, and school grades by 1 percent.
5 Using China's provincial-level data, Li and Zhang (2007) suggest that a decline of the birth rate by 1/1000 will increase the economic growth rate by 0.9 percentage point in a year.
However, there are also detrimental effects: output per capita increases when the policy is imposed, but declines after that. At that time, the fraction of old people as a percentage of total population increases, thereby reducing output per capita. In the steady state, the fraction of old people as a percentage of total population is higher than that in the benchmark. Thus, a one-child policy results in an older population. This is what China will experience in the next few decades. As Table 1 shows, the fraction of population aged 65 and above in China will double in the next twenty years. China will have more people above age 65 than below 15 by 2035.
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One advantage of this paper is that the changes of welfare due to the implementation of a one-child policy can be measured. Intuitively, people who have less education tend to have more children so they are more likely to be constrained and be hurt by the policy.
In contrast, because more educated people tend to have fewer children, they may not be worse off if they automatically have only one child. The results show that only the unskilled adults who prefer unskilled children are constrained by the policy. Other people are willing to have one or fewer kids.
7 The results in partial equilibrium are consistent with the common intuition: the welfare of an unskilled adult is lower because his fertility is restricted. However, in general equilibrium the results are surprising and counter to the intuition. When the policy is introduced, the supply of unskilled labor declines due to the lower fertility of unskilled adults, and then the unskilled wage rate increases. Therefore, an unskilled adult is in fact better off with the policy because of the higher wage rate.
It is interesting to study the effects of a one-child policy when the fertility is relatively low. For example, China's fertility was about 1.77 in [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . Is it worth to continue its one-child family policy? To discuss this issue, I do an experiment which starts with low fertility. The results suggest that the positive effects of the policy is small when the fertility is relatively low. Compared with the social and economic costs of the policy, China may reconsider its population policies for the near future.
This paper provides a useful framework to discuss the effects of a one-child policy.
The results confirm the positive aspects of introducing the policy: higher GDP per capita 6 Source: The UN population projection (the 2008 revision) 7 Zhang and Spencer (1992) find that woman's education and husband's occupation significantly influence compliance of the one-child policy in China. and the accumulation of human capital. The negative effects on the age structure are also found in the experiments. Although China's one-child policy is more complicated than the fertility constraint in the model, this paper shows the importance of accounting for general-equilibrium effects and heterogeneity when discussing population policies.
Studying population policies from an aggregate perspective or partial equilibrium may be misleading.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the benchmark and the model with a fertility constraint. Section 3 discusses the experiments. The results for partial equilibrium and general equilibrium are both provided in this section. Finally, Section 4 concludes this paper.
The Model
The benchmark employs the general equilibrium overlapping generations model of Liao (2009). In the model, an individual can live for at most three periods: childhood, young adulthood, and old adulthood. By assumption, children cannot work but depend on their parents for support. If they survive, they become young adults. The survival probability for children is π c . Then, subject to the survival probability for young adults π y , young adults become old adults who consume their savings. Only young adults supply labor and make decisions. A young adult chooses consumption, asset holdings, the number of children he wants (the fertility), and an education level for his children. Education level is discrete, either skilled or unskilled. The benchmark with endogenous fertility is provided in the first part of this section. Then a fertility constraint is introduced in the second part, representing the implementation of a one-child policy.
Benchmark
A young adult can be either skilled (s) or unskilled (u), which was determined by his parent. Given his type is i, i ∈ (s, u), a young adult derives utilities from consumption for his young adulthood (c i ), consumption for his old adulthood (c ′ i ), and his surviving children. The number of his skilled children is n is , and the number of his unskilled children is n iu . The lifetime utility of an i-type young adult is given by:
where β is the subjective discount factor with respect to utility of consumption; ε determines the elasticity of altruism with respect to the number of children; and 1 σ denotes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. β, ε, and σ are all between zero and one. ψ represents how much a young adult loves his children. V ′ s is the utility that a child will receive when he becomes a skilled young adult, and V ′ u is the utility of a child when he becomes an unskilled young adult. Both utilities are foreseeable and are known when a current young adult is making decisions.
Each young adult has one unit of time. By assumption, only skilled young adults can be teachers. Thus, a skilled young adult can allocate his time between working in the production sector, teaching, and raising children. In contrast, an unskilled young adult only has two options: working in the production sector and raising children. The skilled wage rate for one unit of time is w s . The compensation for being a teacher is also equal to w s . The unskilled wage rate is w u .
Children cannot work but depend on their parents for support. Thus, a young adult need to pay the good cost p and the time cost φ for raising a child. In addition, the education time cost is φ s . Thus, the cost of raising a child is given by:
where i denotes the type of the young adult and j represents the type of his child. The budget constraint for an i-type young adult in his young adulthood and old adulthood is given by:
where r ′ is the interest rate in the next period. There exists a perfectly competitive insurance company. An i-type young adult saves π y a ′ i in his young-adult period. If he survives, he will receive a ′ i for his consumption at old age. Otherwise, he will receive nothing.
The production side is perfectly competitive. There exists one representative firm using skilled labor, unskilled labor, and physical capital as inputs. Because capital-skill complementarity is observed in many developing countries, the main purpose of setting the production function is to generate capital-skill complementarity. Therefore, this paper employs a CES function instead of a Cobb-Douglas function. The production function in this economy is given by:
where A denotes total factor productivity, µ and θ are factor weights that govern income shares, and α and ρ govern the elasticities of substitution between unskilled labor, physical capital, and skilled labor. L u refers to the number of unskilled workers and L s is the number of skilled workers. K is physical capital. Capital-skill complementarity requires that α > ρ. The production function can be rewritten as:
where y pc denotes output per capita, k is the capital-labor ratio, l u is the fraction of unskilled labor as a percentage of total labor, l s is the fraction of skilled labor, and N is total population.
It is shown in Liao (2009) that the young adult's maximization problem has only corner solutions in equilibrium. A young adult will either send all of his children to school or none of them. Skilled children and unskilled children will not live in the same family.
However, it is possible that a specific type of young adults are indifferent between always having skilled children or always having unskilled children in his family. 8 In this case, some young adults of a given type decide to always have skilled children, while others decide to always have unskilled children. Because the total costs of raising a child are different, a young adult who decides to always have skilled children will have fewer children than a young adult who always has unskilled children. A typical case for a balanced growth path is that skilled young adults always have skilled children and unskilled adults are indifferent between always having skilled children and always having unskilled children.
The fertility of unskilled adults is higher than the fertility of skilled adults, so other cases will lead to zero unskilled wage rate. In the typical case, there is an upward mobility and human capital will be accumulated in this economy. In equilibrium, the fraction of unskilled adults having skilled children is determined by the relative utility of having skilled children and unskilled children.
Following the corner solutions and the indifference condition, a young adult only has one type of children. The model can be simplified as follows:
subject to
where p ij is defined in (2) and (i,j)∈ {(s, s), (u, s), (u, u)}. i denotes the type of a young adult and j refers to the type of his children.
A One-child Policy
China's one-child policy refers to the restriction of one child in one family. It is strictly applied to urban areas with few exceptions, such as the first child has a disability. On the other hand, the policy is not strictly enforced in rural areas and the areas with low population. For example, a second child is generally allowed if the first child is a girl in rural areas.
The model in this paper makes no distinction between gender and areas. Every young adult live in the same area and is identical, except for education. Thus a one-child policy is imposed to every young adult without exception. In addition, marriage system is ignored in this model, so there is only one young adult in one family. Each young adult is restricted to have 0.5 child or fewer when the policy is imposed.
To introduce a one-child policy in the model, a fertility constraint is included: n ij ≤ 0.5. Thus, the maximization problem of (7) becomes:
where p ij is defined in (2) and (i,j)∈ {(s, s), (u, s), (u, u)}. i denotes the type of a young adult and j refers to the type of his children. If a young adult prefers having more than 0.5 child, he is forced to satisfy the fertility constraint. If his preference is smaller than 0.5, he is not influenced by the constraint.
Experiments
This section discusses the quantitative analysis of a one-child policy. First, parameters are discussed. Second, transition paths of partial equilibrium for two cases are provided:
the benchmark and the one-child policy. The third part shows the results for general equilibrium. The pure effects of the policy are provided in the fourth part. Finally, sensitivity tests are discussed.
As discussed in the introduction, Taiwan is selected to be an example because of the cultural similarity and the same percentage decrease in fertility in the past decades. In the experiment, two steady states are solved to calibrate to the data of Taiwan in 1970 and 2004, respectively. Then I assume that a transition path starts at the steady state of 1970. In the benchmark, four parameters increase at period 0 permanently to represent the demographic change in Taiwan: the survival probability for children, the survival probability for young adults, the time cost for childrearing, and the education time cost.
The algorithm for solving transition paths are discussed in Appendix.
In the environment with a one-child policy, the transition path also starts with the steady state of 1970. In addition to the changes in survival probabilities and costs of children, the fertility constraint is imposed at period 0. In other words, the only difference between the two environments is the fertility constraint.
To solve a partial equilibrium, I assume the prices (w s , w u , and r) in all transitional periods are equal to the prices in the initial period. Thus, the prices keep unchanged at the level of the steady state of 1970. Time period in the model is twenty-five years. There is no technological progress, thus total factor productivity is one. Sun (2004) employs an annual depreciation rate of 9.25 percent for Taiwan. However, this estimation is only for the manufacturing sector, not for the whole economy. Thus, the annual depreciation rate (δ a ) in the experiments is equal to 9.05 percent, which is suggested by Thangavelu and Heng (2004) . The corresponding depreciation rate of one period in the model is computed by δ = 1 − (1 − δ a ) 25 . To determine the elasticities of substitution, I follow the suggestions in Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) . They estimates that the elasticity of substitution between unskilled labor and physical capital is about 1.67. Furthermore, they also estimate the elasticity of substitution between skilled labor and physical capital to be 0.67. Following their estimate, α is equal to 0.401 and ρ is −0.493, so capital-skill complementarity is guaranteed. Young (1995) and Young (2000) estimate that the income share of total labor in Taiwan is 0.67. Thus, the income share of physical capital is 0.33. The income share of total labor can be decomposed into two parts: the income share of skilled labor and the income share of unskilled labor. The unskilled labor income share is computed by the following formula:
It is interesting to know what
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where l s is the ratio of skilled workers to total workers and l u is the ratio of unskilled workers to total workers. In this paper, "skilled" is defined as college or above. In 1978, the fraction of skilled workers as a percentage of total workers was about 8.51 percent, and skill premium was 1.76. 9 Therefore, the income share of unskilled labor to total labor income was 0.8594 in the first steady state. The corresponding income share of unskilled labor to output was 0.5758, and the corresponding skilled labor income share to output was 0.0942. In 2004, the fraction of skilled workers was 32.9 percent and skill premium was 2.19. 10 Thus, the income share of unskilled labor to total labor income was 0.4914. In 1982-2007, the annual stock market return was about 10 percent in Taiwan. 13 Thus, annual discount factor is equal to 0.9125 to match the annual stock market return. I also assume the preference does not change across time. Therefore, the preference parameters in the second steady state are the same as those in the first steady state.
Liao (2009) percent of his income to rear a child. Thus, the time cost of childrearing is about 0.09.
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13 Annual TAIEX is used to calculate the stock market return. The 25-year accumulated return is computed. Then the annual stock market return is around 10 percent. Annual TAIEX is obtained from Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation.
14 The number of students per teacher is obtained from Department of Statistics, Ministry of Education, Taiwan.
15 The estimation in Liu and Hsu (2004) is the marginal cost of a child in one family. However, there is only one young adult in my model, not a couple. Thus I assume a young adult needs to pay half of the marginal cost, 12 percent. Suppose a young adult's income is 50000 dollars. Then he needs extra 6000 dollars to maintain the same quality of life. 6000 dollars is equal to 10.7 percent of 56000 dollars. Then, the time cost is determined by:
Applying n = 1.6825 to the above equation, the time cost is about 0.09. In the experiments of Section 3.2 and 3.3, demographic change occurs at period 0.
Demographic change refers to the permanent increases in four parameters: the survival probability for children, the survival probability for young adults, the time cost for childrearing, and the education time cost. They increase from the first steady state to the second steady state. The increases in survival rates may because of improvements in sanitation, safer water, and the development of antibiotics and medical science. The increase in the time cost may due to the less contribution of children to home production or the introduction of child labor laws. The increase in the education time cost may because of education reforms (so that a teacher has fewer students) or simply because parents decide to spend more time on education in response to technological change.
Partial Equilibrium
In partial equilibrium, the prices stay at the level of the initial period. Demographic change occurs at period 0. The result shows that the fertility rates of all types in the benchmark significantly decline at period 0 due to the demographic change. The fertility of skilled parents decreases from 1.30 to about 0.41 and the fertility of unskilled parents who prefer skilled children decreases from 1.46 to about 0.45. Therefore, both of them are not constrained by the one-child policy. However, the fertility of unskilled parents who prefer unskilled children decreases from 2.27 to 0.86, which is still higher than the fertility constraint. Thus, this type is constrained by the policy. Besides, young adults adjust their fertility decisions within one period. The transition path immediately converges to a new steady state.
The common intuition of imposing a one-child policy is that people will be hurt by the policy because their choices are limited. Figure 1 shows the transition paths of life-time utility in partial equilibrium. A skilled young adult and an unskilled young adult having skilled children are roughly indifferent between the benchmark and the environment with the policy. Intuitively, it is because the fertility constraint is not binding. They freely make decisions in both environments. In contrast, an unskilled young adult who want unskilled children are worse off when a one-child policy is introduced because his fertility constraint is binding. Therefore, unskilled young adults having unskilled children are suffering from the policy.
There are two sources of deriving utility: having children and consumption. Figure 2 shows the utility derived from consumption. For an unskilled young adult with unskilled children, he loses utility because of lower fertility. On the other hand, he transfers his resources to consumption because he is forced to have lower fertility. Thus, this type derives higher utilities from consumption. Since the loss is larger than the gain, this type is worse off under the one-child policy. The findings in partial equilibrium are consistent with the intuition. Table 3 provides the fertility rates in general equilibrium for the two environments. Demographic change occurs at period 0. Different from the results in partial equilibrium, all fertility rates at period 0 are still larger than 0.5. Therefore, all types are constrained at period 0 when the policy is imposed. After period 0, skilled parents and unskilled parents having skilled children lower their fertility to 0.42 and 0.46, respectively. In contrast, the fertility of unskilled parents with unskilled children is always above 0.9. Thus, only unskilled parents are constrained by the policy after period 0. This is the same as the results in partial equilibrium.
General Equilibrium
However, the changes of welfare in general equilibrium are surprising: A skilled young adult is roughly indifferent between two environments, but the other two types are in fact better off in the environment with the policy. Figure 3 shows the lifetime utility in general equilibrium. Unskilled adults are better off because the policy triggers a decrease in the supply of unskilled labor in general equilibrium. In the model, only unskilled parents will have unskilled children. Skilled parents always prefer skilled children. The decline in the supply of unskilled labor is therefore due to two effects. First, the fertility of unskilled parents who prefer unskilled children is constrained by the policy. Thus, the supply of unskilled labor will decrease when the children become young adults. Second, many unskilled parents transfer to have skilled children when the policy is introduced.
Thus, the supply of unskilled labor declines further. These two effects result in the decline in unskilled labor supply and the higher unskilled wage rate, as shown in Figure   4 . Although unskilled parents who prefer unskilled children is constrained by the policy, they enjoy a higher unskilled wage rate, have higher consumption, and derive higher utility from consumption ( Figure 5 and 6) . Therefore, unskilled adults are in fact better off when the one-child policy is imposed. The results are counter to the intuition, but they demonstrate the importance of accounting for general-equilibrium effects and heterogeneity when analyzing population policies. Figure 7 provides the fraction of skilled labor as a percentage of total labor and output per capita. In the environment with the one-child policy, human capital is rapidly accumulated. In the second steady state, the human capital is about 42 percent higher than that in the benchmark. 16 Besides, output per capita is 12 percent higher than that in the benchmark. Rapid human capital accumulation and fast increases in per capita GDP are also observed in China after the one-child policy was enforced.
However, output per capita fluctuates: output per capita jumps up at the period that the policy is introduced, but declines after that. At that time, the proportion of old people increases, thereby reducing output per capita. After one-period adjustment (one generation), the transition path gradually converges to a new steady state. Figure 8 shows the age structure. The proportion of children is about 27 percent in the benchmark, but it is only 14 percent under the policy. On the other hand, the proportion of old people under the policy is about 57 percent, which is much higher than that in the benchmark. 17 In conclusion, the one-child policy results in an older population. This is exactly what China will experience in the near future. In the year of 1980 that China introduced its one-child policy, the ratio of people aged 65 or above was 4.7 percent.
After 25 years, the ratio almost doubled (7.6 percent). According to the UN population projection (the 2008 revision), the ratio of old people will be higher than 20 percent in 2040.
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Pure Effects
In Section 3.2 and 3.3, the effects of demographic change are included. Thus, the effects of imposing a one-child policy may be influenced by the demographic change. To clarify this issue, a transition path without any changes is compared with a transition path with the policy only.
The first experiment starts with the steady state of 1970. In the first steady state, all fertility are greater than 0.5, so all parents are constrained when the policy is enforced.
As Figure 9 shows, the parents at period 0 are all hurt by the policy. In the second steady state, the policy results in a decrease in the supply of unskilled labor and an increase in the unskilled wage rate. Therefore, unskilled young adults are better off in the environment with the policy. Although skilled parents are also constrained, some unskilled parents transfer to have skilled children. Thus, the policy has small influence on the supply of skilled labor and skilled parents. Overall, the results are quite consistent with the previous results.
This experiment can be interpreted in another way. What Taiwan would be if Taiwan had introduced a one-child policy in the 1970s? This experiment provides a counterfactual analysis for this issue. As Figure 10 shows, the fraction of skilled labor and per capita output both increase dramatically, almost twice as much as they are in the first steady state.
The second experiment starts with the steady state of 2004. This experiment can be interpreted as the future of Taiwan if a one-child policy is introduced at this point. In childhood, 35.6% for the young adulthood, and 30.9% for the old adulthood. In the experiment, the population distribution of the benchmark at the steady state that the path converges to is 26.9%, 33.3%, and 39.8% for the childhood, the young adulthood, and the old adulthood, respectively. 18 Source: World Population Prospects, the 2008 revision, Population Division of the Department of Economics and Social Affairs, UN. http:// esa.un.org/unpp the initial period, the average fertility is as low as 1.18, which is equal to 0.59 per young adult. Only the fertility of unskilled parents who prefer unskilled children is greater than 0.5. Thus, only this type will be constrained when the one-child policy is enforced.
Similar to previous results, unskilled parents will be better off, human capital will be accumulated, and per capita output will increase, as shown in Figure 11 and 12. However, the positive effects of the policy will not be large: the fraction of skilled labor will increase from 33 percent to 41 percent and output per capita will increase by about 6 percent.
These results suggest that the effects of a one-child policy may become small when its fertility is relatively low. Thus, China may change its population policies for the near future.
Sensitivity Tests
In the above discussion, the experiments begin at 1970 due to the data availability. The result shows that the gaps between the benchmark and the one-child policy in the third period could be larger or smaller, but the patterns are quite similar to the primary case. For example, when both state variables are 50 percent lower than those in the primary case, the gap of skill premium between the benchmark and the one-child policy in the third period is 0.30 but the gap is 0.25 in the primary case. The gaps of per capita output are similar. About the population distribution, the gap of the proportion of old people between the policy and the benchmark is 0.21 in the 50 percent case but is 0.19 in the primary case. I also do the experiments with changes of one state variable only.
For example, the proportion of skilled young adults is 50 percent lower than the primary case but physical capital stock does not change. In this case, the gap of skill premium is about 0.33 and the gap of the proportion of old people is 0.20, which are both larger than the primary case, but the patterns are alike. Therefore, the results suggest a similar conclusion to the primary experiment. The assumption of the steady state in 1970 does not have significant influence on the main conclusions.
Conclusions
The debates on China's one-child policy continue after three decades. To explore this issue, this paper introduces a fertility constraint into an overlapping generations model.
Compared with the benchmark, an environment with a fertility constraint is built to represent the implementation of a one-child policy.
The results suggest that imposing a one-child policy promotes the accumulation of human capital. In addition, the economy enjoys higher per capita output. However, output per capita fluctuates after the policy is enforced. This paper also shows the importance of considering general-equilibrium effects and the different reactions of skilled and unskilled adults on the policy. Thus, heterogeneity is important when analyzing population policies. Finally, the results show that the effects of the policy is small if the fertility is relatively low, suggesting that China may revise its population policies in the near future. This paper does not make judgments on China's one-child policy. Based on the experiments, this paper suggests that unskilled adults are better off under the policy. However, it is important to note that the model in this paper is simplified and some issues are not included in the model. For example, skill-biased technological progress may increase the demand of skill labor and decrease the demand of unskilled labor. In this case, the effects on unskilled adults are unclear. Besides, the one-child policy in China is more complicated than a fertility constraint. For example, China's policy provide economic incentives (penalties and subsidies) for parents to change their fertility decisions. Therefore, this paper provides a framework of introducing a one-child policy; but does not make strong judgments on it.
Appendix: Algorithm for Solving a Transition Path Transition Path for General Equilibrium
The initial period is a steady state representing Taiwan To solve a transition path, I initially guess a sequence for each of these variables: {w s , w u , r, V ss , V uu , λ us } and then update all sequence at the same time. Given the initial guess, the fertility of each type (n ss , n us , n uu ) can be solved. Then, I compute the number of skilled workers, the number of unskilled workers, the fraction of skilled labor as a percentage of total labor (l s ), the fraction of unskilled labor (l u ), and physical capital per labor (k). Now the new price (w s , w u , r) can be computed by marginal product. Since the fertility of each type has been calculated, the following variables for each type can be solved: asset holdings, consumption for young adulthood, consumption for old age, new life-time utility, and output per capita. At this point, based on the initial guess, the second period is solved. Then, state variables of the next period are computed so that the third period can be solved. I repeat this procedure to compute every period.
After all periods are calculated, I have new sequences of w s , w u , r, V ss , and V uu . They are updated by a linear combination of the initial guess and the new values. λ us is updated by the following equation:
where ν is the updated speed. The iteration stops if two criteria are satisfied at the same time: (i) The guess and the new values are very close to each other; (ii) V us and V uu are close to each other. In equilibrium, V us is equal to V uu so that an unskilled young adult is indifferent between having skilled children and unskilled children.
In the case of the benchmark, four parameters go up at period 0: the survival rate for children (π c ), the survival rate for young adults (π y ), the time cost of childrearing (φ), and the time cost of education (φ s ). Table 2 reports the values in the first steady state and in the second steady state. For example, the survival rate for children is equal to 0.9305 before period 0, and it is equal to 0.9666 at and after period 0. The determination of these values are discussed in Section 3.1. Other parameters remain unchanged.
In addition to the permanent increases in four parameters, the fertility constraint n ij ≤ 0.5 is permanently imposed after period 0 when I solve the transition path for the case of a one-child policy. Before period 0, I apply the same algorithm to compute the transition path for the case of imposing the policy. After period 0, the fertility constraint should be taken into account. At the beginning, I assume all types are not constrained and solve their fertility decisions. Then, I check five possible cases to determine the correct fertility: (1) If the fertility decisions without constraint are all smaller than or equal to 0.5, the constraint is not binding. Thus, the correct fertility is equal to the fertility decisions without constraint. (2) If the fertility decisions without constraint are all larger than 0.5, the constraint is binding for all types. Thus, the correct fertility of each type is equal to 0.5. (3) If the type ss and uu are both binding but the type us is not binding, n ss and n uu should be equal to 0.5. Then, given n ss and n uu are both equal to 0.5, I solve n us again.
If the new n us is smaller than or equal to 0.5. The new n us is the correct fertility for type us. Otherwise, the correct fertility for type us should be equal to 0.5. (4) If n us and n uu are binding but n ss is not binding, the correct fertility of type us and type uu are both equal to 0.5. Then I solve n ss again. If the new n ss is smaller than or equal to 0.5, it is the correct fertility of type ss; otherwise, the correct fertility of type ss is equal to 0.5. (5) If n uu is binding but n ss and n us are not binding, then n uu is equal to 0.5. Then I solve n ss and n us again. There are four possibilities for the new n ss and n us . First, if both of them are smaller than or equal to 0.5, the new n ss and n us are the correct fertility for the corresponding types. Second, if both of them are larger than 0.5, the correct fertility for both types should be equal to 0.5. Third, if n ss is larger than 0.5 but n us is not binding, the correct fertility of type ss is 0.5. Given n ss and n uu are both equal to 0.5, I solve n us again. If the new n us is smaller than or equal to 0.5, it is the correct fertility for type us;
otherwise, n us is equal to 0.5. Fourth, if n ss is not binding but n us is binding, n us should be equal to 0.5. Given n us and n uu are both equal to 0.5, I solve n ss again. If the new n ss is not binding, it is the correct fertility for type ss; otherwise, n ss should be equal to 0.5. also permanently increase at period 0 when demographic change occurs. In the case of a one-child policy, the fertility constraint is imposed. Then, I check possible cases using the algorithm that I discussed above. 
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